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The Policing of Prosecutors: More
Lessons from Administrative Law?
Aaron L. Nielson*
ABSTRACT
On a daily basis, prosecutors decide whether and how to
charge individuals for alleged criminal conduct.  Although many
prosecutors avoid abusing this authority, prosecutors’ discretion-
ary decisions might result in biased enforcement, inappropriate
leveraging of authority, and a lack of transparency.  These
problems also arise when agency enforcement officials decide
whether to act on conduct that violates a legal prohibition.
An inherent tension between the desire to avoid overbur-
dening the system and the need to prevent inconsistent decision-
making exists in the exercises of both prosecutorial discretion
and regulatory enforcement discretion.  It is clear from the simi-
larities between the two that administrative law may offer some
important lessons to criminal law.  This Article explores the need
for transparency and consistency in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and argues that governments can devise a system simi-
lar to regulatory waivers and exemptions to achieve that goal.
To frame this discussion, this Article examines recent recom-
mendations adopted by the Administrative Conference of the
United States on how agencies should use discretionary authority
to grant waivers and exemptions.  This Article posits that prose-
cutors can increase transparency and consistency when exercising
discretion by:  (1) adopting systems of prospective waiver; (2) no-
tifying the legislature when laws become outdated; and (3) docu-
menting the rationale behind a decision not to charge an
individual.  By examining criminal law through the administra-
tive law lens, this Article provides solutions to a familiar prob-
lem:  the abuse of discretion.
* Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
Many thanks to Daniel McConkie for providing comments.  The study discussed in
this Article was conducted with the support of the Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS).  For the recommendations that the ACUS adopted
based on that study, see 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728 (Dec. 29, 2017).  The views expressed
in this Article are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the ACUS or its
members.
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INTRODUCTION
Be warned:  I am not an expert on prosecutors—or, indeed,
any part of the criminal justice system.  Apart from pro bono cases,
a short stint as a law student at a United States Attorney’s Office,
and a few years clerking, I have not spent much time with criminal
law, much less studying the role of prosecutors in it.  My world is
primarily administrative law and civil litigation, usually in federal
court.  Hence, at first blush, I might seem like a strange person to
write about the “duties of the modern prosecutor.”  That said,
Rachel Barkow—who, by any measure, knows a great deal about
prosecutors—has observed that administrative law may have les-
sons to teach criminal law.1  Similar questions of government power
and institutional design arise in both contexts.2  In fact, the overlap
between criminal law and administrative law can be substantial.3
1. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) [hereinafter Bar-
kow, Institutional Design] (using administrative law to examine institutional design
for prosecutors); Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 316, 316 (2014) (“I would like to persuade you to see the criminal justice
system in the United States as a regulatory system.”); see also Richard A.
Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“Although calls for reforming plea bargaining are decades old,
only a few scholars have approached the issue from an administrative law perspec-
tive.”); Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Adminis-
trative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 495–96
(1976) (urging greater use of administrative law checks); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2136–41,
2143 (1998) (“A second, more radical, approach would acknowledge, at least in
part, that our system has taken on an administrative law tinge, and then insist that
it at least live up to the standards of administrative law.”).
2. See, e.g., Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 1, at 874 (“The problems
posed by federal prosecutors’ combination of adjudicative and enforcement func-
tions are the very same issues raised by the administrative state—and the solutions
fit equally well in both settings.”).
3. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (granting certiorari
on Question 4 only).  Question 4 asks:  “Whether SORNA’s delegation of author-
ity to the Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) vio-
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Although there are obvious differences (in my years involved with
administrative law, for instance, I have never heard whispers of a
jury, except in the context of patent law, which is its own beast4),
Barkow’s insight strikes me as true enough, at least at a certain
level of abstraction.
This short Article will focus on an aspect of administrative law
that is relevant to prosecutorial discretion in criminal law:  regula-
tory waivers and exemptions.  When it comes to excusing otherwise
prohibited conduct, criminal law and regulatory law are analogous.5
In both contexts, the relevant decision-maker (the prosecutor in
criminal law and the agency enforcement official in administrative
law) must decide not only how but also whether to “bring the ham-
mer down” on conduct that violates a legal prohibition.6  In making
that decision, in both contexts, the decision-maker must consider
many of the same factors, such as resource constraints, likelihood of
lates the nondelegation doctrine.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Gundy v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (No. 17-6086).  For more examples of the
overlap between criminal law and administrative law, see Brief of Amicus Curiae
Institute for Justice in Support of Reversal at 5, Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1260 (2018) (No. 17-6086) (“The President now makes more law than Congress—
by an order of several magnitudes—and regulatory agencies have promulgated
hundreds of thousands of federal criminal offenses.”); cf. Eisha Jain, Arrests as
Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015) (“Arrests now serve as a significant
source of regulation, separate and apart from their role in the criminal justice sys-
tem.”); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Regulation by Prosecutor, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forth-
coming), https://bit.ly/2G4ydMl [https://perma.cc/N7F4-FNXA] (explaining how
prosecutors can use plea agreements to regulate future conduct).
4. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 281, 282 (2013) (“Any scholar of modern administrative law
surely knows that there is an error in the title of my paper.  Federal administrative
law in our era provides for judicial review—not jury review—of administration
action.”); id. at 283 (“[P]atent law continues to have a system of judicial review
remarkably different from the norms prevailing elsewhere in federal administra-
tive law.”). But see id. at 284 (noting examples of jury review of executive action
outside of patent law—notably involving criminal law).
5. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1354 (2008).  According to Barkow:
In contrast to juries and executives, prosecutors are seen as making an
‘expert’ determination about priority-setting when they choose not to
bring charges.  Just as agencies escape oversight when they refuse to act—
because they are balancing resource constraints and other considera-
tions—prosecutors avoid scrutiny because they are viewed as making a
professional determination based on their expertise in prioritizing cases.
Id.
6. AARON L. NIELSON, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WAIV-
ERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN EXAMINATION OF
AGENCY NONENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 1 (2017) [hereinafter NIELSON, WAIVERS,
EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION], https://bit.ly/2BIts7i [https://per
ma.cc/DDX9-TK64] (quoting FTC Brings the Hammer Down on Trans Union
Sales of Credit Info, CREDIT RISK MGMT. REP., Mar. 8, 2000, at 1).
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success, and the egregiousness of the violation.7  And in both con-
texts, some of the same problems may arise, including biased en-
forcement,8 inappropriate leveraging of enforcement authority,9
and lack of transparency.10
7. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to
institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor . . . not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the spe-
cial province of the Executive Branch . . . .”).  In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme
Court further noted:
Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred,
but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular
enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action
at all.  An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of
the statute it is charged with enforcing.
Id. at 831.
8. Compare Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006)
(“[Prosecutors] are human, and all human decision makers share a common set of
information-processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.”), with
NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“The criteria used to make waiver determinations are essential.  If they are
opaque, the danger of arbitrariness (or worse) is increased.  Complainants the
agency ‘likes’ can be excused, while ‘difficult’ defendants can find themselves
drawing the short straw.”), and Ruth Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial Indis-
cretion, 63 TUL. L. REV. 877, 880 (1989) (noting risk of bias).
9. Compare Fred A. Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and
the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 589 (1994) (“Those who have
observed the criminal justice system are concerned that ‘the enormous range of
discretion held by prosecuting authorities in the United States allows them to use
the law for political and other improper ends . . . .’”), with Aaron L. Nielson,
Nonenforcement and the Danger of Leveraging, LOY. U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), https://bit.ly/2GnovDY [https://perma.cc/72JE-
HCGR] (“An agency, for example, may use a quid pro quo to obtain ends that are
beyond the mission Congress set for it.  Or the agency may decide that it wants
something from the regulated party, and so go looking for a harmless, technical
violation that the agency would not otherwise pursue.”).
10. Compare Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 911 (2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency
and Participation] (“The insiders who run the criminal justice system—judges, po-
lice, and especially prosecutors—have information, power, and self-interests that
greatly influence the criminal justice system’s process and outcomes.  Outsiders—
crime victims, bystanders, and most of the general public—find the system frustrat-
ingly opaque, insular, and unconcerned with proper retribution.”), with Abbe R.
Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1789, 1818 (2015) (noting the lack of “laws, procedures, or assurances of
transparency” associated with waiver), and Paul B. Stephan, The Political Econ-
omy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957, 968 (2002) (noting “that administrative
agencies” may “engage in selective enforcement of facially neutral rules” and
“[t]he inherent lack of transparency attendant to prosecutorial discretion makes it
difficult to correct such tendencies”).
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This analogy matters because a great deal of recent administra-
tive law thinking has focused on waivers and exemptions.  In partic-
ular, in December 2017, the Administrative Conference of the
United States—comprised of administrative law experts from the
academic, public, and private sectors—adopted a series of recom-
mendations regarding how agencies should use discretionary au-
thority to grant waivers and exemptions.11  As a consultant to that
project, I prepared the underlying report for those recommenda-
tions; in so doing, I surveyed and interviewed numerous agency of-
ficials to explore discretionary nonenforcement and to identify best
practices to mitigate the danger of such discretion’s abuse.  This Ar-
ticle is intended to evaluate which of those recommendations may
be of use in the criminal context.  Likewise, I will briefly address
what may be the hardest problem in this context, at least concep-
tually:  making prosecutorial discretion more transparent without
undermining compliance with the law.
In so doing, I stress that, like regulatory enforcement discre-
tion, prosecutorial discretion has important benefits and that prose-
cutors—who have a difficult job and merit appreciation12—no
doubt usually exercise their discretion well.  Thus, the goal should
not be to eliminate prosecutorial discretion (which, of course, is not
realistic in any event).  Rather, as is often the case with discretion,
the objective should be to find the optimal amount of it; this is chal-
lenging to do, but at least conceptually, optimization should be the
objective.13  To be clear, I do not claim that these recommendations
are novel in the context of either administrative law or criminal law.
What is significant about these recommendations, however, is that
they have been carefully reviewed by an assembly of regulatory ex-
perts who approached the problem from different institutional per-
11. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2017-7, Regulatory Waiv-
ers and Exemptions, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017).
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (explaining the complex system of constraining forces that
prosecutors must navigate); Idaho Criminal Justice Reform Panel, 10 IDAHO CRITI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. J. 63, 78 (2016) [hereinafter Reform Panel].  Representative
Rau´l Labrador, a panelist on Idaho’s Criminal Justice Reform Panel, noted:
We also have to realize that prosecutors have a very hard job.  You know,
they are overworked, they have a lot of people that they have to look—a
lot of cases that they have to look at, so, you know, I think one of the
issues that—my experience with prosecutors has generally been a very
positive one.
Reform Panel, supra note 12, at 78.
13. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary
Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1972) (“Given the
complex considerations operating for and against controlling discretion, finding
the ‘optimum’ combination of discretion and ‘law’ is easier said than done.”).
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spectives.  Hopefully that vetting process has produced
recommendations that may do some good in the real world.
I. BACKGROUND
Even a relative outsider like me knows that one of the biggest
questions in criminal law is how to best address prosecutorial dis-
cretion.14  On the one hand, such discretion has real value; presum-
ably no one thinks that maximalist enforcement of every criminal
law is always appropriate in every circumstance, no matter what.15
In light of “bounded rationality,”16 it is impossible for lawmakers to
anticipate every situation that may arise, meaning that—inevita-
bly—some set of facts will arise that technically fall within the
scope of a general prohibition but do not merit punishment or, at
least, merit a lesser punishment.17  When such situations arise, soci-
ety benefits when a prosecutor stands down.18  On the other hand,
discretion is not costless.  It may “create[ ] the risk that improper
factors will enter the decision-making calculus without being ex-
posed,” which can be especially problematic when a lot of conduct
is potentially unlawful.19  In other words, prosecutorial discretion is
both useful and potentially dangerous.20
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Fed-
eral Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 1 (2009)
(“Prosecutorial discretion is a central component of the federal criminal justice
system.”) (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.9(c) (3d
ed. 2007)).
15. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 675 (2014) (citations omitted) (explaining that one constitu-
tional benefit sought by separating legislative and executive functions was “to cre-
ate a safety valve that protects citizens from overzealous enforcement of general
prohibitions”).
16. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the
Law: A Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1547 (2018)
(“[I]t is not costless for the lawmaker to anticipate activities that are not problem-
atic and write legal prohibitions that do not capture such activities, especially if
some unobjectionable activities are idiosyncratic; bounded rationality applies to
lawmakers, too.”).
17. Cf. id.
18. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010) (explaining why prosecutorial discre-
tion is important).
19. Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 1, at 884.
20. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49
GA. L. REV. 757, 759 (2015) (“Discretion, in other words, is both valued and
feared.”); Geoffrey C. Shaw, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal
Process School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013) (explaining that one of the
most challenging questions in all of law is how to benefit from discretion without
facilitating its abuse).
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This same tension exists in administrative law.  Agencies, as a
rule, have considerable discretion when it comes to pursuing en-
forcement actions.21  This is not by accident.  Like criminal statutes,
regulatory provisions also are not always a great fit for every cir-
cumstance; bounded rationality applies in the regulatory context
too.  Likewise, sometimes a regulatory prohibition can achieve its
desired purpose (for instance, a safe workplace) through less bur-
densome means.  When that happens it often makes sense to use
those less burdensome means.  This is why Congress sometimes en-
acts legislation affirmatively encouraging regulated parties to pro-
pose alternatives that, if approved by the relevant regulator, would
result in a waiver of the general prohibition.22  Despite those bene-
fits, however, “agency discretion regarding nonenforcement can be
problematic.”23  According to Richard Epstein, the power to waive
regulatory duties may raise rule-of-law concerns because a regu-
lated party’s ability to operate might depend on persuading a regu-
lator to use its discretion to waive a prohibition—a dynamic that
runs contrary to classic notions of liberty.24  Whether consciously or
not, regulators may sometimes use their discretionary power to re-
ward those who make their lives easier and punish those whom they
dislike for whatever reason.25  The appearance of unfairness is also
a risk.26  Thus, as with criminal law, the power to excuse noncompli-
ance can also be problematic when it comes to regulation.
21. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 273 (2013); NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, supra note 6, at 2 (“As a general matter, agencies
have a great deal of discretion whether to enforce legal provisions.”).
22. See, e.g., NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DIS-
CRETION, supra note 6, at 50 (“[The Trial Disclosure Program] allows regulated
parties to propose a new form of disclosure that conflicts with the agency’s regula-
tions.  Congress explicitly gave the agency this power.  The idea is that perhaps a
regulated party can produce a better disclosure than what the regulations currently
require.”) (discussing Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs; Information
Collection, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,389 (Oct. 29, 2013) and 12 U.S.C. § 5532(e) (2018)).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Richard A. Epstein, Government By Waiver, 7 NAT’L AFFAIRS 39, 54
(2011), https://bit.ly/2G8LqDK [https://perma.cc/8LAP-MJZ5] (“The fate of our
rights and liberties is left to the wisdom and discretion of individuals; we are there-
fore governed by men, not by laws.  It was this exact circumstance that our system
of government was designed to avoid . . . .”).
25. See NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (explaining the danger of allowing regulators too much discretion over
waiver).
26. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742 (“For instance, when an
agency decides to waive legal requirements for some but not all regulated parties,
the decision to grant a waiver or exemption may create the appearance—or per-
haps even reality—of irregularity, bias, or unfairness.”).
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With such tension in mind, in 2016 the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States determined that regulatory nonenforce-
ment merited the Conference’s attention.  The Administrative
Conference “is an independent federal agency charged with con-
vening expert representatives from the public and private sectors to
recommend improvements to administrative process and proce-
dure.”27  It accomplishes its mission by commissioning reports for
review by various committees of experts with diverse views and in-
stitutional perspectives.  These committees then formulate recom-
mendations for regulatory reform.  Afterwards, the full
Conference—consisting of 101 voting members, plus other non-vot-
ing members28—meets in a plenary session to debate those recom-
mendations.  Recommendations that command a majority of
support at the Conference are then reported in the Federal
Register.
In late 2017, the Administrative Conference commissioned me
to study agency nonenforcement.  To do this, I prepared and sent a
survey to various agencies.  Nine responded:  the Alcohol and To-
bacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB); the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund; the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (CFPB); the Employee Benefits Security Administration; the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration; the Federal Transit Authority; the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA); and the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.  After receiving the
agencies’ responses, I also interviewed officials from the TTB,
CFPB, FAA, and MSHA.  After I prepared my report, the Admin-
istrative Conference’s Committee on Administration and Manage-
ment reviewed it and developed recommendations.  With minor
adjustments, the full Conference then approved those
recommendations.
27. ACUS, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://bit.ly/2WyWG1v [https://perma.cc/
35XC-M2LQ]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 591(1) (2018).
28. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE FOR MEMBERS 3 (2017),
http://bit.ly/2SFubN5 [https://perma.cc/P74N-4RR9] (“The Assembly is the name
given to the 101 statutory voting members of the Conference meeting in plenary
session.”); id. (“The government members of the Conference are current, senior
officials at other government agencies.”); id. at 4 (“The public members of the
Conference are drawn from the general public.  They are typically leading authori-
ties in administrative law, public administration, or other areas of interest to the
Conference.  Most public members are lawyers, but some are experts in other dis-
ciplines.  The public members come primarily from academia, law firms, and public
interest organizations.”); id. (“There are three additional categories of participants
who have all the privileges of Conference members, except that they may not vote
or make motions in plenary sessions of the Conference.”).
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Although the Conference commissioned me to study waivers,29
exemptions,30 and “prosecutorial discretion,”31 the Committee
quickly determined that including prosecutorial discretion in the
recommendations was too big of a bite for a single project.  Even
though there are similarities across these nonenforcement catego-
ries, prospective nonenforcement32 differs from retrospective non-
enforcement in terms of culpability:  the law often treats those who
seek authorization before acting differently from those who violate
the law first and then seek vindication.33  Likewise, the costs and
benefits of transparency may differ when it comes to retrospective
nonenforcement.  For example, agencies generally appear to be
more hesitant to reveal enforcement priorities to those who have
already violated the law, presumably because agencies do not want
to reward violations.34  In survey responses, for instance, agencies
were less willing to discuss their practices regarding prosecutorial
discretion.35
29. See NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION,
supra note 6, at 28 (defining “waivers” as prospective authorization to allow other-
wise prohibited conduct, pursuant to express statutory authority).
30. See id. at 28 (defining “exemptions” to have the same meaning as waivers,
with the exception that they are done pursuant to implied statutory authority).
31. See id. at 27 (defining “prosecutorial discretion” as nonenforcement of a
violation for which the agency had not granted a waiver or exemption
beforehand).
32. As I explain in my report, waivers and exemptions are two types of pro-
spective nonenforcement; the line between them (if there is a line) is not well de-
veloped. See id. at 37.
33. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929–30 (1975) (treating
those who violated a prohibition differently from those who instead sought pre-
enforcement review); United States v. King, No. CR-08-002-E-BLW, 2008 WL
5070329, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 26, 2008), aff’d, 660 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Con-
gress recognized the human frailty that makes it ‘easier’ to seek forgiveness than
permission, and countered that tendency by requiring permission to precede
injection.”).
34. See, e.g., Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 1, at 912 (“As an initial
matter, publishing detailed guidelines could undermine law enforcement goals.  If
prosecutors announce, for example, enforcement thresholds, deterrence could be
compromised.”) (citing Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal
Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246,
297 (1980)).
35. See NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION,
supra note 6, at 45.  In my report, I noted:
Agencies were reticent to share too much information about their exer-
cises of prosecutorial discretion.  This is not altogether surprising.  An
agency’s decision to not enforce the law where violations have occurred
can be sensitive.  Agencies may not want regulated parties to know ex-
actly where the line is; if an agency’s enforcement priorities are cloaked
in mystery, more entities will comply with the law.
Id.; see also id. (“The PHMSA, EBSA, MSHA, and CDFI did not respond to this
section of the survey [at all] . . . .”).
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Nevertheless, I included the issue of prosecutorial discretion in
my report.  I did so because of the Administrative Conference’s ini-
tial recognition that prosecutorial discretion shares similarities with
waivers and exemptions.
II. SOME SIMPLE IDEAS
Reviewing the Administrative Conference’s list of recommen-
dations, three ideas strike me as potentially relevant to criminal
law.  First, to the extent possible (which may very well require legis-
lation), prosecutors should consider establishing systems of pro-
spective waiver.  If prosecutors were to create and publicize these
systems of prospective waiver, then members of the public would
know the prosecutors’ views on potentially actionable conduct
before they engage in said conduct.  Second, if prosecutors find
themselves excusing a great deal of similar conduct, then they
should notify the legislature that it might be time to change the law.
And third, prosecutors should devise systems to better treat like
cases alike, including carefully documenting why discretion was
used in a particular case in a way that makes it possible to compare
the rationale across defendants and individual prosecutors.
A. Create a System of Prospective Waiver
The first recommendation approved by the Administrative
Conference is as follows:
When permitted by law, agencies should consider creating mech-
anisms that would allow regulated parties to apply for waivers or
exemptions by demonstrating conduct that will achieve the same
purpose as full compliance with the relevant statutory or regula-
tory requirement.36
Along similar lines, the Administrative Conference also recom-
mended that “agencies should consider providing written explana-
tions of representative instances to help illustrate the types of
activities likely to qualify for a waiver or exemption.”37
At first blush, this type of recommendation may seem counter-
intuitive; after all, if the fear in administrative law is that agencies
will abuse waiver authority, why entrust agencies with that author-
ity in the first place?  Such a reaction, however, misunderstands the
dual nature of discretion.  Discretion is dangerous, but it can also be
valuable.  Indeed, “[a]lthough all selective waivers may be suspect,
36. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
37. Id.
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there are surely some circumstances under which they are accept-
able.”38  Because nonenforcement discretion has important upsides,
where the dangers of its abuse can be reasonably contained, it often
makes sense to affirmatively create discretion.39  The Administra-
tive Conference determined that waivers and exemptions is such a
context.
With that view of discretion in mind, the idea behind this rec-
ommendation is as follows.  Sometimes a member of the public
might have a good reason not to follow the law.  For instance,
where strict compliance with the law will result in a more dangerous
situation, it makes sense to grant a waiver.  When such a situation
arises, and if time permits, it would be best if the regulator could
credibly inform the person that such action will or will not result in
an enforcement action; this would allow the regulated party to en-
gage in socially beneficial behavior.  Thus, the Administrative Con-
ference urged regulators that did not have a system in place to
review proposed actions to create such a system, to the extent the
law allows.40  Notably, Congress has already demonstrated its will-
ingness to allow agencies to develop waiver systems.  For example,
Congress permitted the CFPB to prospectively authorize language
in financial materials that differs from the language that is normally
required, so long as the regulated party can demonstrate that the
alternative language is equally effective.41  And the MHSA has a
system in place to grant waivers where strict adherence to the law
will result in situations that are either less safe than a proposed al-
38. Epstein, supra note 24, at 45.  According to Epstein:
The question, then, is whether these duties and requirements must be
enforced in absolutely all circumstances.  To any reasonable observer, the
answer is surely not:  The immense range of circumstances that present
themselves in a huge, complex society means that there will always be
hard cases calling for exceptions.  Sometimes various requirements have
to be waived to avoid unreasonable hardship, and sometimes various re-
quirements have to be waived for the system to function at all.
Id. at 42.
39. See id. at 45 (“Ultimately, an appeal to sound discretion is the best
formula anyone has devised for dealing with this problem.”).
40. If the law does not allow the regulator to create such a system, it may
make sense to change the law. My analysis here obviously depends on the law
allowing such nonenforcement.
41. See, e.g., NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DIS-
CRETION, supra note 6, at 50–51.  Notably, regulated parties almost never use these
options. See, e.g., id.  This does not mean that creating more options is not a good
idea that Congress should not repeat elsewhere.  In other agencies, waiver author-
ity is used much more robustly. See, e.g., id. at 52–55 (examining the FAA’s
experience).
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ternative or are equally safe but the alternative would be more eco-
nomical for the party.42
To be sure, one concern with waivers is that only sophisticated
entities will learn of them, thus resulting in an unequal playing field.
To avoid this problem, the Administrative Conference also urged
that when “practicable,” regulators should “make standards and
procedures for seeking and approving waivers and exemptions
available to the public.”43  Similarly, although not covered by the
Administrative Conference’s recommendations44 but consistent
with its logic, where there are questions about whether conduct is
lawful or not, agencies should consider creating a system that would
allow a member of the public to ask for clarification about the
agency’s reading of the law before acting.  Potentially, at least when
consistent with Article III requirements (if it involves federal prose-
cution), such a system would also provide the relevant person with
the right to immediate judicial review of that determination.45
Perhaps a similar approach could be taken in the context of
criminal law.  It is difficult to identify all situations involving crimi-
nal law in which such prospective nonenforcement authority would
be beneficial to the public.  At a minimum, however, crimes similar
to or associated with regulatory duties surely fit the bill.  To be sure,
there are also many situations in criminal law that are not amenable
to this recommendation.  Violent street crime, for instance, is un-
likely to be blessed ex ante by a prosecutor (thank goodness!), even
if there were time to make the request.  But to the extent that indi-
viduals or businesses seek to engage in conduct that does not un-
dermine the purpose of the prohibition or otherwise create
dangerous situations, and when there is time for prospective review,
there may be some value in such a system.
Another concern is that the number of requests for nonen-
forcement may be significantly higher in the context of criminal law
than in the regulatory space.  For instance, although the MSHA is
busy, prosecutors presumably have a lot more people to worry
about; if waivers were allowed, prosecutors may be overwhelmed
by requests.  Whether that is true is an empirical question.  If that is
42. See id. at 55–57.
43. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
44. The Administrative Conference’s recommendations focused on waivers of
prohibitions.  These are situations where it is undisputed that the proposed activity
would be unlawful without a waiver.
45. In recent years, the Supreme Court has facilitated such immediate judicial
review in administrative law. E.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136
S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016); Sackett v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374
(2012).
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the case, however, prosecutors can choose to implement a modified
waiver system that is better suited to their needs.  For instance, a
prosecutor’s office could establish a waiver system whereby if cer-
tain objective criteria are met, a prosecutor will provide prospective
review, but not otherwise; such a system would limit waiver to the
most important situations.  Alternatively, a prosecutor’s office may
be able to prepare a streamlined process for the most common
types of questions.  The FAA provides an example.  In recent years,
the FAA has started regulating drones.  This change has required
the agency to consider thousands of waiver requests.46  The FAA
has been able to better consider such requests by standardizing the
procedure.47
As in the regulatory context, should a local jurisdiction estab-
lish a waiver scheme, it is important for that scheme to be well pub-
licized.  One of the concerns with waiver is unequal information;
some entities may seek waiver more than others, not because of the
substantive merits of their requests, but because of their legal so-
phistication.  Presumably the same sort of problems will arise in the
context of criminal law.48  Thus, publicity is important in both ad-
ministrative and criminal law contexts.  Relatedly, when establish-
ing a waiver system, transparency is also important.  The
Administrative Conference observed that “[a]gencies should con-
sider soliciting public comments before establishing standards and
procedures for seeking and approving waivers and exemptions.”49
In the context of prosecutorial discretion, to the extent that the rel-
evant decision-maker is the legislature, there is no reason why this
process should not be transparent.
B. Retrospective Review
The Administrative Conference’s second approved recommen-
dation may also be worth considering in the criminal context, al-
though it also may have to be modified for many prosecutors:
46. See NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION,
supra note 6, at 53 (“[A]lthough the agency has only recently begun tracking the
number of waivers granted, its exemption practice is vigorous; indeed, it has re-
ceived over 16,000 requests for nonenforcement regarding drones since August
2016 alone.”).
47. See id. (“No doubt driven by this volume, the agency has developed a
standardized approach to nonenforcement.”).
48. Cf., e.g., Bibas, Transparency and Participation, supra note 10, at 912 (not-
ing the “gulf” between “knowledgeable” insiders and “poorly informed, powerless
people”).
49. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
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When consistent with the statutory scheme, agencies should en-
deavor to draft regulations so that waivers and exemptions will
not be routinely necessary.  When an agency has approved a
large number of similar waivers or exemptions, the agency should
consider revising the regulation accordingly.  If eliminating the
need for waivers or exemptions requires statutory reform, Con-
gress should consider appropriate legislation.50
There are two overlapping ideas here.  The main idea is that legisla-
tors should avoid overly broad legislation because even if enforce-
ment discretion can be used for good purposes, such discretion is
also susceptible to abuse.  Accordingly, although it is more difficult
to draft tailored legislation, legislative bodies should strive for such
legislation and not simply assume that enforcement discretion will
save society from the ills associated with overly broad laws.  The
second idea is similar to the first.  If regulators find themselves re-
peatedly granting waivers to those engaged in the same sort of con-
duct, the regulator or the legislature perhaps should modify the
prohibition itself.  In this way, waiver serves as a signal to regulators
that retrospective review may be warranted.
Many commentators have suggested that some criminal laws
are overinclusive.51  That certainly seems possible.52  Just as in the
regulatory context, as a rule, legislators should avoid overly broad
laws in the first instance by drafting more precise statutes.  Moreo-
ver, after a law is on the books, legislators should set up systems to
learn when the law is not enforced because prosecutors have deter-
mined that the conduct at issue falls outside of the law’s intended
scope.  If prosecutors regularly conclude that enforcement of a law
is not warranted, that should be a signal to the legislature that per-
haps the time has come to revise the statutory code.53  This recom-
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1567, 1610 (2011) (“In our criminal justice system we need protection from
overinclusive or overrigid laws that criminalize benign behavior.”); cf. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 28, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451)
(Scalia, J.) (“What kind of a mad prosecutor would try to send this guy up . . . ?”).
52. See, e.g., Danielle Garrand, Virginia City Threatens Trick-or-Treaters over
the Age of 12 with Jail Time to Thwart Halloween Mischief, CBS NEWS (Oct. 9,
2018), https://cbsn.ws/2TsY5EB [https://perma.cc/GAC8-E3G8] (explaining that a
city has criminalized trick-or-treating by those older than 12, even though “the city
says it won’t be ‘actively seeking out violations’” because the concern is not with
trick-or-treating but instead non-trick-or-treating mischief).
53. Obviously, it is problematic when a prosecutor uses prosecutorial discre-
tion to negate a policy choice by the legislative branch. See, e.g., Price, supra note
15.  Indeed, in the federal system, that sort of decision arguably may violate the
Take Care Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (declaring that the President “shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).  That issue is beyond the scope of
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mendation works in tandem with the prior one; when a formal
system of prospective nonenforcement exists, it is easier to identify
which conduct prosecutors are regularly excusing.  The legislature
therefore should try to learn how often prosecutors determine non-
enforcement is appropriate and in what contexts.
Some may object that this recommendation is not realistic in
the criminal context because too many people are making decisions.
Maybe that is correct, at least in some situations.  This Article does
not address all of the practical objections, especially because the
number of contexts in which criminal law applies is extraordinary.
Instead, more modestly, my point is only that overinclusive laws are
a seedbed for discretion’s abuse.  When prosecutors regularly ex-
cuse a particular type of conduct, then that is some evidence that
the law at issue may be overinclusive; at a minimum, it is something
that the legislature should know about.  That commonsensical ob-
servation applies in the regulatory context and may have purchase
in the criminal context too.
C. Create Systems to Ensure Consistency
The Administrative Conference also issued two additional, re-
lated recommendations that could be transplanted into prosecutors’
offices:
Agencies should endeavor, to the extent practicable, to establish
standards and procedures for seeking and approving waivers and
exemptions.54
Likewise:
Agencies should apply the same treatment to similarly situated
parties when approving waivers and exemptions, absent extenu-
ating circumstances.55
The notion that like cases should be treated alike is one of the
foundations of administrative law;56 indeed, courts and legal schol-
this Article, however.  The focus of this Article is on conduct that technically falls
within the scope of a law but that was not considered by the legislature and is
considered unobjectionable by all involved.  When such unobjectionable conduct is
rightly excused, especially if it happens often, that should be a signal to the legisla-
ture that the law should be amended.
54. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521,
526 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The rule in this case does not undermine the discretion
granted by Congress but simply ensures that like cases will be treated alike—a
necessary condition for ‘avoid[ing] an arbitrary discretion in the courts.’”) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
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ars regularly refer to it as a key component of the rule of law it-
self.57  When a large number of individuals are making a large
number of decisions, however, it can be hard for the system to be
consistent.  One better way to achieve consistent decision-making is
by having the decision-maker write explanations for why he or she
used discretion in a particular case.  In administrative law, many
commentators recognize the value of such written explanations.58
Accordingly, to help ensure consistency in the regulatory context,
the Administrative Conference urged agencies to “provide written
explanations for individual waiver or exemption decisions and
make them publicly available to the extent practicable and consis-
tent with legal or policy concerns, such as privacy.”59
These recommendations could be applied to prosecutors too.
As to prospective waivers, the analogy is obvious.  But prosecutors
could also apply a standardization process to retrospective
prosecutorial discretion.  Even if prosecutors do not publicize their
written analysis, they should strive to develop internal systems to
ensure consistency, including through written explanations.  Al-
though prosecutors may be reluctant to share their thought process
with the public, the simple act of preparing a written explanation
can help the prosecutor ensure that he or she has made a reasoned
decision.60
III. THE HARDER PROBLEM
It is (relatively) easy to see how the recommendations set out
above can be transplanted into the criminal law context, especially
to the extent that they refer to prospective nonenforcement.  The
harder problem is transparency, particularly transparency for retro-
spective nonenforcement.  The Administrative Conference recom-
57. See United States v. Aragones, 483 F. App’x 415, 418 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“The most fundamental rule of law is that like cases should be decided alike
. . . .”); WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, No. 1:15-CV-2026-WJM, 2016 WL 8577508,
at *4 (D. Colo. June 17, 2016) (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 160 (2d
ed. 1994)) (similar).
58. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural
Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 687–88 (2014).  To be sure, reason-giving is not always
optimal. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 489 (2015)
(“[A]lthough reason-giving is important, it is often in tension with other values . . .
such as guidance, sincerity, and efficiency.”).  Even so, there is a reason that it
plays such an important role in administrative law.
59. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
60. See Effron, supra note 58, at 714 (“The decisionmakers themselves benefit
from reason giving insofar as it clarifies one’s own thinking and illuminates facts or
conclusions that might need additional support.”).
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mends that “[a]gencies should endeavor, to the extent practicable,
to make standards . . . for . . . approving waivers and exemptions
available to the public.”61  Yet when it comes to prosecutorial dis-
cretion for crimes already committed, prosecutors may be wary of
publicizing their standards; if members of the public know that
prosecutors will not penalize them for engaging in certain unlawful
conduct, then they may choose to ignore that the conduct is unlaw-
ful and engage in it more frequently.  There is no simple answer to
this problem.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to increase transparency, even
when it comes to prosecutorial discretion.  As Adam Cox and Cris-
tina Rodrı´guez have explained:
The argument against transparency in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion conflates two very different types of en-
forcement settings.  In one, the legal system makes clear that the
desired level of some conduct is zero.  In such a setting, there
ideally would be perfect compliance with the legal prohibition.
But compliance might fall short of that, and the government may
lack the resources to punish every single violator.  In that con-
text, secrecy about enforcement strategy can be valuable, and
transparency can threaten legal compliance.  The threat to com-
pliance will be most palpable when an offense can be committed
in multiple ways, or in multiple places.  In such situations, pub-
licizing what law enforcement officials will be looking for, or
where they will be looking, can make it easier for would-be viola-
tors to avoid having their legal violations detected.  Secrecy
about law enforcement tactics, even to the extent of randomizing
those tactics, can often increase compliance, both by raising the
risk of detection and by creating more uncertainty about the level
of risk.  For these reasons, the IRS works hard to keep its audit
algorithms secret, state highway patrols do not disclose the loca-
tions of speed traps, Customs and Border Patrol frequently
moves the roving checkpoints it uses along the southern border,
and the CIA and other intelligence agencies resist disclosure of
their surveillance tactics.62
By contrast, Cox and Rodrı´guez argue that in other contexts, it
is expected that the government will excuse some conduct, even if it
had unlimited resources to police it, because the law “requires the
Executive to assume responsibility for sorting ‘deserving’ violators
61. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 11, at 61,742.
62. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The President and Immigration
Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 202 (2015).
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out from non-deserving ones.”63  In that context, Cox and Rodrı´-
guez argue that a lack of transparency is much less defensible.64
Although there is force to such a distinction, there are
problems too.  To begin, the argument’s premise merits examina-
tion.  Should there really be laws that, by design, are overinclusive?
Some prosecutorial discretion is worthwhile because it is impossible
to foresee every situation that may arise.  Yet that is different from
concluding upfront that certain conduct should not be punished but
nonetheless still enacting a prohibition that technically covers it, on
the theory that public enforcers will later sort out who merits an
exemption from the overbroad law.  The goal, arguably, should be
to minimize the instances in which prosecutorial discretion is neces-
sary by better matching the prohibitions on the books with the con-
duct that society wants to prevent.  When that nexus is tightened,
there is less need to worry about transparency, because the statute
book itself is open for all to read and the words on the page match
what the law really is.65  In any event, there are few laws in which
the goal is perfect enforcement.  It is impossible to predict every
situation that may arise.66  The reality that perfect enforcement is
essentially never the goal (because unforeseen situations always
may arise that fall within the scope of the prohibition but yet not its
purpose) may complicate how we should think about transparency.
There are other reasons why transparency is a difficult issue.
We may want to publicize the standards used by prosecutors even
when perfect compliance is the goal because secrecy may not be
63. Id. at 203.  Cox and Rodrı´guez argue that immigration law is such a con-
text. Id.  Whether that is true (and if so, whether it should be true) is beyond the
scope of this Article.
64. See id. at 204.  According to Cox and Rodrı´guez:
If we think that low-level . . . possession by a person with no other crimi-
nal record should not be punished, then we should hope that judgment
applies to all cases, not to a random subset of violators.  And we would
not worry that publicizing the policy would undermine legal compliance,
because the very point of the exercise of discretion would be to communi-
cate that possession under those circumstances does not deserve
punishment.
Id.
65. Cf. Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 557 (2009).
The traditional concept of fair notice demands that no person be held to
account under a law the content of which he was unable to know before-
hand.  By seeking to discern the most reasonable, plain meaning of a stat-
ute, textualism by its very definition seeks to satisfy this dictate of fair
notice . . . .
Id.
66. Evaluating the sorts of policy concerns inherent in line-drawing should be
done by the legislature when enacting the law.  Nonenforcement makes the most
sense when a situation arises that the legislature, reasonably, did not anticipate.
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possible.  Selective transparency is problematic; it is unfair if insid-
ers (say, former employees) know enforcement practices while
others do not.  To prevent that situation, at least in theory, it may
make sense for prosecutors to divulge enforcement practices more
broadly, even in situations where there are no “deserving” viola-
tors, despite the fact that doing so will result in less overall compli-
ance with the law.  Likewise, without transparency, there may be
more biased enforcement (across any number of dimensions) be-
cause public scrutiny is more limited.  Ultimately, the solution will
be normative—hopefully based on empirical data that, as of yet,
has not been collected.  How much leakage of secret information
occurs?  How much inequality occurs with and without trans-
parency?  And how much should society value fairness in this con-
text?  These issues merit more thinking and, hopefully, empirical
study.
CONCLUSION
Nonenforcement discretion is both valuable and dangerous.67
That insight from administrative law is relevant to criminal law.
When it comes to choosing which violations to pursue, prosecutors
have a great deal of discretion.  Agencies also often have discretion
whether to bring an enforcement action.  Thus, the lessons learned
from administrative law may benefit criminal law too.
These lessons are not especially shocking.  Legislators should
endeavor to draft laws that do not prohibit unobjectionable con-
duct.  Because it is impossible to do that perfectly (even if legisla-
tors are being careful), it also makes sense to create systems that
allow those who wield government power to excuse unobjection-
able conduct that technically violates overbroad legal prohibitions.
When prosecutors regularly excuse the same sort of conduct, per-
haps the law should change.  And transparency can also be valua-
ble, although it has costs of its own and may sometimes create
difficult dilemmas.
Implementing these lessons will not solve all that ails criminal
law, just as doing so will not turn administrative law into a perfect
system.  The world is too complicated for easy fixes.  Yet perfection
should not be the standard.  What matters is that these lessons may
better allow criminal law to benefit from discretion while, at the
same time, minimizing its abuse.
67. Cf. Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
1645, 1652–53 (2015) (explaining that when discretion is unchecked, “legal lapses
and violations occur” more often).
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